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THE DECLINE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE JOURNEY
FROM DICTA TO DOGMA IN Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053
(1990).
Abstract: In Duro v. Reina, the Supreme Court held that tribal courts do not have
jurisdiction over Indians committing crimes within their territorial jurisdiction, but not
belonging to their tribe. This holding is incompatible with judicial precedent as well as
contemporary executive and congressional policy. The decision also creates serious practi-
cal problems for tribal, federal and state authorities by leaving a jurisdictional void over
nonmember Indian criminals. A holding that tribal courts have jurisdiction over all tribal
Indians who commit crimes on reservations would have been in harmony with judicial,
congressional and executive precedent, and would not have created equal protection
problems.
In the last decade the United States Supreme Court has assumed an
activist role in limiting the inherent sovereignty of American Indian
tribes by creating and expanding the "inherent limitations" doctrine.
The latest product of this trend, Duro v. Reina, I bodes ill for tribes in
its characterization of the nature of inherent tribal sovereignty, and in
its indications that the Supreme Court will continue to find inherent
tribal powers implicitly divested.
There is a presumption in Indian law that tribes retain all sovereign
powers not expressly divested by Congress or inconsistent with the
tribes' status as domestic dependent nations. The Supreme Court held
in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe2 that powers inconsistent with
the tribes' status were implicitly divested when the United States
assumed sovereignty. Under this "inherent limitations" doctrine the
tribes lost their sovereign power to assert criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians even though Congress, the primary source of Indian law
and policy, had not expressly taken away that power.
Dicta in decisions following Oliphant suggested that assertions of
tribal power over any6ne other than members of the asserting tribe
was likewise inconsistent. This dicta was transformed into dogma in
Duro, in which the Court applied the inherent limitations doctrine and
1. 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990). Congress recently passed H.R. 5803, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990),
overturning Duro until September 30, 1991. The senate conference report accompanying the bill
stated that it was designed to address "an emergency situation in Indian country that is the result
of a recent holding of the Supreme Court... known as Duro v. Reina . 5..." S  REP. No. 101-
938, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1990) [hereinafter "Senate Report"].
2. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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held that tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over nonmember tribal Indi-
ans 3 who commit crimes on reservations.
The Duro holding is incompatible with judicial precedent, federal
law, and federal policy, all of which support the development of tribal
self-determination. A better holding would have upheld tribal juris-
diction over any tribal Indian who commits a crime on a reservation,
based upon a theory of implied consent. The holding of the case is not
the only cause for tribes to be concerned, however; the reasoning
behind the holding-in particular its characterization of the nature of
tribal sovereignty-indicates that the present Court may be hostile to
a broad range of attempts by tribes to assert powers over anyone other
than their own members.
I. THE DURO DECISION AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
PRIOR TO DURO
A. The Duro Decision
Albert Duro was an enrolled member of the Torrez-Martinez Band
of Mission Indians.4 Duro was a resident of California and lived most
of his life outside of any tribal reservation.5 For three months Duro
lived within the Salt River Indian Reservation with his girlfriend, an
enrolled member of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community
(Community).6 Duro was not eligible for membership in the Commu-
nity.7 Duro worked for the PiCopa Construction Company, which
was owned by the Community.
While living on the Salt River Reservation, Duro allegedly shot and
killed a tribal Indian on reservation territory.9 A federal grand jury
indicted Duro for first degree murder.'0 On request by federal prose-
cutors the district court dismissed the indictment without prejudice"
and placed Duro in the custody of tribal authorities.2 The Commu-
nity charged Duro with illegal discharge of a firearm within reserva-
3. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2059. Throughout this Note "nonmember tribal Indians" will refer to
Indians who are enrolled members of a tribe other than the tribe asserting jurisdiction. The term
does not include persons of Indian ancestry who are not enrolled in any tribe.
4. Id. at 2056.
5. Id. at 2057.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 2056. As a nonmember, Duro could not vote in tribal elections or sit on tribal juries.
Id.
8. Id. at 2057.
9. Id. The victim was a member of a third tribe. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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tion boundaries, a violation of the Community's Code of
Misdemeanors." 3
Duro moved for dismissal in tribal court, contending the tribe
lacked criminal jurisdiction over him because he was not an enrolled
member of the Community.14 The tribal court denied the motion, but
the district court granted Duro's petition for habeas corpus and
released him.' 5 The Community appealed and the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding Duro's status as an enrolled member of an Indian
tribe and his significant contacts with the Community justified tribal
jurisdiction. 6 Duro appealed and the Supreme Court reversed. 17
The Supreme Court rejected the Community's argument that its
retained sovereign powers gave it jurisdiction over Duro. According
to the Court, criminal jurisdiction over Duro was inconsistent with the
tribe's status as a dependent of the United States."8
B. Tribal Sovereignty and Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Before Duro
The Duro case must be examined in context with the rich historical
background of Indian law, which dates back to the birth of our
nation.19 An understanding of this context is necessary to evaluate the
impact of the Duro decision.
13. Id. at 2058. The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Pub. L. No. 90-284 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988)), limits the penalties a tribal court may impose to one year in jail
and a $5000 fine. The Federal Major Crimes Act, ch. 341 § 9 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1153 (1988)) provides for federal jurisdiction over 14 major offenses occurring in Indian
country, including murder. Although tribal courts may have concurrent jurisdiction over the
crimes listed in the Major Crimes Act when committed by tribal members on reservations, the
practical consequence of the ICRA penalties limitation is that tribal criminal codes cover only
misdemeanors.
14. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2058.
15. Duro v. Reina, 12 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 3003 (D. Ariz.
1985), rev'd, 821 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1987), revised, 851 F.2d 1136, rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990).
The court reasoned that because tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians under
Oliphant, subjecting nonmember Indians to tribal jurisdiction would constitute invidious racial
discrimination in violation of ICRA.
16. Duro v. Reina, 821 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1987), revised, 851 F.2d 1136, rehg denied, 860
F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990).
17. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2059. The decision resolved an inter-circuit conflict. The Eighth
Circuit had held in Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1988), that tribes lacked such
jurisdiction.
18. For a discussion of the Court's rationale, see infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
19. History is particularly important in Indian law:
Indian law itself is one of the most historical of all areas of law.... [I]t is an historical truth
(if there can be such a thing) that this collection of doctrines and decisions we call Indian
law is merely an expression of Indian policy. And that policy is little more than the
collected value judgments of society at any given moment: a matter of history. Indian law
grows from, and is merged in, the historical experience.
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1. Inherent Tribal Sovereignty
When the United States became dominant sovereign, the tribes
became, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "domestic dependent
nations."2 As such, the tribes retained their "inherent" sovereign
powers except where those powers were diminished by the overriding
sovereignty of the United States.21 Both Congress and the courts can
impact this retained sovereignty.
Congress has plenary power over the tribes and can diminish or
extinguish tribal powers at will.22 The legal and historical relationship
between Congress and the tribes has led Congress to assume a unique
trust responsibility over Indian tribes.23 Congress is responsible for
the welfare and interests of the tribes and for balancing Indian and
non-Indian interests when they come in conflict.24 Congress has occa-
Strickland, Introduction to Indian Law Symposium-Indian Law and Policy: The Historian's
Viewpoint, 54 WASH. L. REV. 475 (1979).
20. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1823).
21. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832); see also F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 231-32 (1982 ed.):
Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, supported by a host of decisions
hereinafter analyzed, is the principle that those powers which are lawfully vested in an
Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but
rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.
McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), diminished the importance of inher-
ent tribal sovereignty in the context of conflicts between state and tribal sovereignty. McClana-
han held that in such disputes courts should look first to federal statutes and treaties to
determine the extent of exclusive tribal authority, viewing retained tribal sovereignty as a "back-
drop" to that analysis. Id. at 172-73. Inherent tribal sovereignty has continued to be a determi-
native factor where state power is not at issue, however. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982); Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322; Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191, 195-96 (1978).
22. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 (1978); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
Congress's plenary power over the tribes is drawn from the Indian commerce clause, U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Morton v. Maneari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974).
23. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian
Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 992-1009 (1981). The federal status of
Indian affairs grew out of conflicts between the budding states and the tribes. Id. at 992. The
threat of wars from these conflicts prompted the framers to adopt the Indian commerce clause,
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which gave the federal government exclusive power over commerce
with the tribes. Id. at 993. Judicial decisions, beginning with Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 515,
recognized the relationship as a trusteeship and this perception continues today. Id. at 1002.
24. Of course, not all of Congress'ss actions in pursuit of this responsibility have benefited the
tribes. For example, the allotment and termination policies, ostensibly enacted to benefit Indians
by forcibly integrating them into mainstream society, were ultimately disastrous to tribal
interests. Clinton, supra note 23, at 1020-27. Over the last two decades Congress and the
Executive branch have attempted to fulfill their responsibility toward the tribes in a less
paternalistic fashion than in the past, by encouraging tribal self-determination. Id. at 1004; see
infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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sionally limited the sovereign powers of the tribes through treaties and
statutes.
25
Tribal powers may also be diminished through judicial action. The
Supreme Court has held that certain powers were implicitly given up
by the tribes as a necessary consequence of their acceptance of United
States "protection."26 The Court does not actually take powers away
from tribes under the inherent limitations doctrine; rather, the doc-
trine recognizes that the powers ceased to exist when the United States
became primary sovereign.'
2. The Federal Policy of Encouraging Tribal Self-Determination
Since 1970, federal policy has strongly supported the growth and
independence of tribal governments. 28 This policy is reflected in exec-
utive and congressional policy statements and in federal statutes.2 9
3. Tribal Jurisdiction Within Federal Criminal Jurisdictional
Statutes
Congressional statutes define the scope of federal criminal jurisdic-
tion within reservation lands. In 1817, Congress extended federal
criminal law to Indian country.3" The statute specifically limited the
extension of federal jurisdiction to crimes involving non-Indians, how-
ever, stating that nothing in the act "shall be so construed as ... to
25. For example, ICRA, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988), imposes procedural protections upon tribal
courts similar to those in the Bill of Rights, and limits the penalties tribal courts can impose.
26. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). The Oliphant Court
maintained that this principle was implicit in Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543
(1823) (holding tribes did not possess title to reservation lands, the United States having
exclusive title by right of discovery), and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)
(stating in dicta that "any attempt by [foreign nations] to acquire [tribal] lands, or to form a
political connexion with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and an
act of hostility"). Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209.
27. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210 ("By submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United
States, [the] tribes necessarily g[a]ve up their power .... ").
28. See generally Clinton, supra note 23, at 980 n.3; Collins, Implied Limitations on the
Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 WASH. L. Rav. 479, 483 (1979); Gross, Indian Self-
Determination and Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Recent Federal Policy, 56 Tax. L. REv.
1195 (1978).
29. See, eg., S. RP. No. 101-938, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Indian Self-Determination &
Educational Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a-450n (1988); Statement on Indian Policy, 19
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 98 (Jan. 24, 1983); Message From the President of the United
States, Transmitting Recommendations for Indian Policy, 6 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 894
(July 8, 1970).
30. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (repealed 1834). "Indian country" is defined, in
part, in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988) as "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation .... "
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extend to any offence committed by one Indian against another, within
any Indian boundary. "31
Congress continued to exempt Indian-against-Indian crimes from
federal jurisdiction in section 25 of the Indian Trade and Intercourse
Act of 1834,32 and again in its successor statute, the Indian Country
Crimes Act.33 The Indian Country Crimes Act extended federal law
to Indian country, but expressly provided that it would not apply to:
offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of
another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian
country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any
case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such
offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.
34
The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress intended
for the exception to extend to all tribal Indians, without regard to the
relationship between the Indian and the tribe asserting jurisdiction.35
The Supreme Court and the Executive branch recognized that the
exception extended to Indians generally. In United States v. Rogers,36
the Court held that the Indian-against-Indian exception had nothing
to do with tribal membership.37 And in 1883 the Solicitor General
wrote an opinion, later approved by the Attorney General, concluding
that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction to try a Creek Indian
for the murder of an Arapaho Indian within the Pottawatomie Reser-
vation. 3' The opinion indicated that the "concerned" tribes would
31. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (repealed 1834).
32. ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (repealed in part) (codified as carried forward and amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1160, 1165, 25 U.S.C. §§ 177, 179, 180, 193, 194, 201, 229, 230, 251, 263, 264).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988) This statute (often referred to as the "General Crimes Act")
descends from laws enacted between 1778 and 1871. F. COHEN, supra note 21, at 287.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988).
35. H.R. Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1834) (emphasis in original):
It will be seen that we cannot, consistently with the provisions of some [of] our treaties, and
of the territorial act, extend our criminal laws to offences committed by or against Indians,
of which the tribes have exclusive jurisdiction; and it is rather of courtesy than of right that
we undertake to punish crimes committed in that territory by and against our own citizens.
And this provision is retained principally on the ground that it may be unsafe to trust to
Indian law in the early stages of their Government. It is not perceived that we can with any
justice or propriety extend our laws to offences committed by Indians against Indians, at any
place within their own limits.
36. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
37. The Rogers Court rejected the argument that a crime involving two non-Indians who had
been adopted into an Indian tribe fell within the Indian-against-Indian exception, stating "[the
exception] does not speak of members of a tribe, but of the race generally-of the family of
Indians; and it intended to leave them both, as regarded their own tribe, and other tribes also, to
be governed by Indian usages and customs." Id. at 573.
38. 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 566 (1883).
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have jurisdiction over the crime if they approved laws "substantially
conformable to natural justice." 39
C. The Duro Court's Analysis
It was in the context of the principles of Indian law just described
that the Duro Court considered the limits of tribal sovereignty. The
Salt River Community claimed that inherent tribal sovereignty gave it
criminal jurisdiction over all tribal Indians, both members and non-
members, who commit crimes covered by its criminal code within its
reservation.' The Court disagreed.4 1
The Court began by noting that Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe42 and United States v. Wheelera3 provided the "analytic frame-
work" for its decision, although in neither of those cases was the issue
of the inherent power of tribes over nonmember Indians before the
Court.' Oliphant held that the criminal jurisdiction of tribes over
non-Indians was implicitly divested under the inherent limitations
doctrine.4" Wheeler held that it was not double jeopardy for a tribal
Indian to be convicted in both tribal and federal courts for offenses
arising out of the same incident.' The Court reasoned that Duro was
"at the intersection of these two precedents, for here the defendant is
an Indian, but not a member of the Tribe that asserts jurisdiction."'
39. Id. at 570.
40. See Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2059 (1990).
41. See id. at 2056.
42. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
43. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
44. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2059.
45. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210. The opinion focused upon an historical analysis of the
relationship between Indian tribes and non-Indians. Id. at 197-208. Its holding was based upon
two tenets: (1) Congress, the Executive branch, and the courts shared an historical presumption
that tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, and this historical presumption
carries "considerable weight"; and (2) tribes were implicitly divested of criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians as a necessary consequence of their dependent status (the "inherent limitations"
doctrine). Id. at 209-12. Tribal courts are not subject to the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (fifth amendment does not apply to tribal prosecutions). They are,
however, subject to ICRA, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988), which provides most of the same
protections. The Oliphant Court found that it would be inconsistent with the importance the
United States places upon criminal procedural rights to allow non-Indians to be tried in courts in
which constitutional protections do not apply. 435 U.S. at 210.
46. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 329-30. The defendant in Wheeler pleaded guilty in the court of his
tribe to disorderly conduct and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. He was later indicted
in federal court for statutory rape based upon the same incident. This was not double jeopardy,
the Supreme Court held, because a tribe's criminal jurisdiction over its own members is derived
from retained sovereignty and not from the sovereign power of the United States. Id.
47. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2059.
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The Court determined that Oliphant, Wheeler, and later cases estab-
lished a rule that inherent tribal powers are limited to matters con-
cerning the tribes' "internal relations.""8 Criminal jurisdiction over
Duro did not involve the Community's internal relations because
Duro was not a member of the Community, and "[f]or purposes of
criminal jurisdiction, [Duro's] relations with [the Community] are the
same as the non-Indian's in Oliphant."49 Duro, the Court noted, is a
Unites States citizen, and thus "share[s] in the territorial and political
sovereignty of the United States."5° The Court asserted that "[t]he
retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a recognition of certain addi-
tional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent to be
tribal members,"" t and because Duro had not consented to be a mem-
ber, the tribe had no jurisdiction over him.2
The Court found support for its position in five Solicitor General
opinions that it claimed "provide[d] the most specific historical evi-
dence on the question."53 The Court dismissed the statutory scheme
of federal criminal jurisdiction as irrelevant to issues of tribal
jurisdiction. 4
II. THE DURO DECISION IS BAD LAW AND BAD POLICY
The Duro decision is incompatible with judicial precedent and with
the federal jurisdictional scheme. Its consent-based characterization
of tribal sovereignty is contrary to the understandings of prior courts,
the federal government, scholars, and the tribes. Duro is the latest in a
series of decisions actively diminishing the sovereignty of Indian tribes
through expansion of judicially-created dogma. It will cause unneces-
sary trouble for tribes and endanger reservation inhabitants.
48. Id. at 2060.
49. Id. at 2061, 2063. The Court cited language distinguishing between members and
nonmembers in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981); Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 161 (1980); and Wheeler, 435
U.S. at 326. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2060-61; see infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text. It also
noted that Duro could not vote in tribal elections, hold tribal office, or sit on tribal juries. Duro,
110 S. Ct. at 2061. The Court recognized that tribes could assert civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers, but explained that criminal jurisdiction "involves a far more direct intrusion on
personal liberties." Id.
50. Id. at 2063.
51. Id.
52. Kennedy wrote for the majority: "A tribe's additional authority comes from the consent
of its members, and so in the criminal sphere membership marks the bounds of tribal authority."
Id. at 2064.
53. Id. at 2063.
54. Id. at 2062.
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A. The Duro Holding Is Inconsistent With the Reasoning of
Oliphant and With the Congressional Intent Implicit in the
Federal Criminal Jurisdictional Scheme
The Duro decision is inconsistent with the rationale of Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe,5" and also frustrates Congress's apparent
desire to leave non-felony inter-tribal crimes56 to the jurisdiction of
tribal courts. A straightforward application of the Oliphant analysis
would have supported tribal jurisdiction in Duro, and a logical inter-
pretation of the federal jurisdictional scheme would have revealed
Congress's intent to preserve tribal jurisdiction over inter-tribal
crimes.
In Oliphant, the Court held that the historical presumption by Con-
gress, the Executive branch, and the courts that the tribes lacked crim-
inal jurisdiction over non-Indians carried "considerable weight." '57
The Oliphant Court devoted much of its opinion to showing that this
presumption existed.5" Applying the same analysis to Duro would
have resulted in a holding in favor of tribal jurisdiction, for the federal
government's historical reluctance to assert jurisdiction over inter-tri-
bal crimes implies a presumption by Congress that the tribes had juris-
diction over such crimes.59
The federal criminal statutory scheme deliberately excluded Indian-
against-Indian crimes from federal jurisdiction.6° Neither the statute
nor its legislative history refers to tribal membership. 61 Furthermore,
the courts and the Executive apparently agreed that the exception
applied to Indians generally, regardless of whether they were members
55. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
56. The term "inter-tribal crimes" refers in this Note to crimes committed by individual tribal
Indians within the jurisdiction of a tribe other than the one to which they belong.
57. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206; see supra note 45.
58. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 197-206. The Court's historical analysis was sharply criticized by
commentators. See, eg., Collins, supra note 28, at 490-99.
59. As a Senate committee recently stated in support of HR 5803 (overturning Duro for one
year): "Throughout the history of this country, the Congress has never questioned the power of
tribal courts to exercise misdemeanor jurisdiction over non-tribal member Indians in the same
manner that such courts exercise misdemeanor jurisdiction over tribal members." Senate
Report, supra note 1, at 133.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988); see supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988); H.R. REP. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1834); see supra
notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
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of the forum tribe.62 The states also lacked jurisdiction over such
crimes.63
Two conclusions are possible from this set of circumstances: either
(1) Congress presumed that tribes had no jurisdiction over inter-tribal
crimes, and intentionally created a jurisdictional scheme in which no
entity would have jurisdiction; or (2) Congress presumed that tribes
had jurisdiction over such crimes, and left that jurisdiction intact with
the Indian-against-Indian exception. Only the second interpretation
makes sense of the statutes and their legislative history. Congress's
deliberate refusal to extend federal jurisdiction over inter-tribal crimes,
the Supreme Court's recognition that the exception was not based
upon tribal membership, and the Solicitor General's opinion that the
federal government did not have jurisdiction over an inter-tribal
crime, demonstrate that all three branches historically shared a pre-
sumption that tribes possessed jurisdiction over such crimes. The
Duro Court relied heavily upon Oliphant, yet failed to explain why the
presumption in favor of tribal sovereignty evidenced by section 1152
was not entitled to the same weight as the Oliphant court gave to the
contrary presumption. 64
The Duro Court also overlooked the significance of the fact that the
Indian-against-Indian exception reflected Congress's desire to have tri-
bal courts assert jurisdiction over inter-tribal crimes. The Court
skirted the issue by dismissing the federal scheme as relevant only to
issues of federal jurisdiction .6  However, the tribes did not contend
that federal statutes gave tribes jurisdiction over inter-tribal crime.
Instead they argued that Congress promulgated the Indian-against-
Indian exception out of a desire to leave the recognized jurisdiction of
the tribes over such crimes intact. Oliphant recognized the importance
of Congress's intentions by stating that tribes gave up their power to
62. Unites States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 573 (1846); 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 566 (1883);
see supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
63. At the time § 1152 was passed states only had jurisdiction within reservations over crimes
between non-Indians. Although early Supreme Court decisions held states had little or no
authority within tribal reservations, see, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561
(1832), the Court later held that state jurisdiction extended into Indian country where a crime
involved only non-Indians. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882).
64. The limited historical analysis done by the Duro Court was selective and self-serving. The
Court simply ignored evidence contrary to its conclusions, such as 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 566 (1883);
see supra note 38 and accompanying text. The Court also chose to ignore evidence that the tribes
had asserted jurisdiction over nonmember Indians for years, see Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of
Six American Tribes at 2-6, Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990) (No. 88-6546), although the
Oliphant Court found it significant that tribes had not traditionally exercised jurisdiction over
non-Indians. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 197 (1978).
65. Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2062 (1990).
576
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try non-Indian citizens "except in a manner acceptable to Congress."66
Clearly tribal jurisdiction over inter-tribal crimes was acceptable to
Congress, or Congress would not have included the Indian-against-
Indian exception in section 1152.67
In sum, unless the Court meant to imply that Congress intentionally
created a jurisdictional void when it enacted the Indian-against-Indian
exception, the Court necessarily imposed its implicit divestiture hold-
ing over the shared contrary presumptions of Congress, the Executive,
and prior Courts, in contravention of the reasoning in Oliphant.
B. The Duro Holding Is Inconsistent With the Historical Nature of
Tribal Sovereignty
The Duro Court's assertion that residual tribal sovereignty is "but a
recognition of certain additional authority the tribes maintain over
Indians who consent to be tribal members"6  is inconsistent with prior
understandings of the nature of tribal sovereignty. Tribal govern-
ments have traditionally been viewed as similar to other sovereign gov-
ernments, except that they lack powers expressly divested by Congress
or inconsistent with their dependent status.69 Tribes are "unique
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their mem-
bers and their territory."70 They are "a good deal more than 'private,
voluntary organizations.' "71 Their sovereign powers had never previ-
ously been held to be based upon consent; in fact, a prior case, Merrion
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,72 expressly rejected a consent-based theory of
tribal sovereignty.
66. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210. The Duro Court hinted, however, that Congress may not have
the power to subject citizens to the jurisdiction of courts not bound by the Bill of Rights. Duro,
110 S. Ct. at 2064 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), which held unconstitutional an
attempt by Congress to subject the wives of American servicemen abroad to trial by military
tribunals without the protection of the fifth and sixth amendments).
67. Rather than divest the tribes of jurisdiction, Congress made tribal courts compatible with
modern principles of criminal justice by passing ICRA, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988), which provides
most of the same protections as the Bill of Rights, and which limits the penalties tribal courts can
impose.
68. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2063; *see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
69. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Worcester v. Georgia, 31, U.S. (6
Pet.) 515, 555, 557, 561 (1832); F. COHEN, supra note 21, at 231-32.
70. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (holding that tribal sovereignty was
sufficient to support a congressional delegation of authority to control non-Indian liquor sales on
fee land within Indian country); see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)
(holding double jeopardy clause did not bar an Indian from being tried in federal and tribal court
for the same offense).
71. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 557.
72. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
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The Merrion majority held that it was within the inherent sovereign
powers of an Indian tribe to impose a severance tax on non-Indian oil
and gas companies. Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that because
the companies could not participate in tribal government, imposition
of the tax went against the "fundamental principle" that "in this
nation each sovereign governs only by the consent of the governed." 73
The Merrion majority explained that Stevens had "confuse[d] the
Tribe's role as commercial partner with its role as sovereign,' 74 and
that
[c]onfusing these two results denigrates Indian sovereignty.
... Whatever place consent may have in contractual matters and in
the creation of democratic governments, it has little if any role in mea-
suring the validity of an exercise of legitimate sovereign authority.
Requiring the consent of the entrant deposits in the hands of the exclud-
able non-Indian the source of the tribe's power, when the power instead
derives from sovereignty itself... Indian sovereignty is not conditioned
on the assent of a nonmember; to the contrary, the nonmember's pres-
ence and conduct on Indian lands are conditioned by the limitations the
tribe may choose to impose.75
The new majority in Duro simply ignored this recent rejection of its
theory of tribal sovereignty.
The Duro Court construed Wheeler to implicitly define the tribes'
retained sovereignty as "that needed to control their own internal rela-
tions, and to preserve their own unique customs and social order." 76
Yet the Court had previously held that tribes have civil jurisdiction
over nonmembers.77 Although the Court distinguishes between civil
and criminal jurisdiction by stating that the latter involves a greater
intrusion into personal liberties,78 the Court does not explain how
criminal jurisdiction is any less an aspect of the internal relations of
tribes than civil jurisdiction. In fact, criminal jurisdiction over non-
members is logically more closely related to tribes' internal relations,
because the maintenance of law and order on reservations more
directly impacts the preservation of the tribes' "unique customs and
73. Id. at 173 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426 (1979)).
Justice Stevens contended that the companies could only have consented to be taxed
contractually in their lease agreement, which they had not done. Id. at 186.
74. Id. at 145.
75. Id. at 146-47.
76. Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2060 (1990) (emphasis added).
77. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
78. Duro. 110 S. Ct. at 2061.
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social order." The Court makes no attempt to reconcile this
inconsistency.
No other sovereignty remotely resembles the consent-based model
that the Merrion dissent and the Duro Court describe. Despite the
"fundamental principle" that all democratic governments rule by the
consent of the governed, the sovereign powers of governments are not
dependent upon the willingness of individuals to submit to them. For
example, one need do nothing more than commit a crime within
United States territory to place oneself within the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts.79 Similarly, commission of a crime within a state subjects the
nonresident to state jurisdiction.80 The power asserted by these sover-
eigns has little to do with the consent of individuals. If there is any
consent at all it is implied by the act of entering the jurisdiction. Nor
is sovereign authority based upon the participation of individuals in
government. If it were, United States jurisdiction over aliens and state
jurisdiction over nonresidents would be improper.
The closest parallel to the Duro Court's notion of tribal "sover-
eignty" is a voluntary club which conditions membership upon sub-
mission to club rules. But past decisions made it clear that tribes are
"a good deal more than 'private, voluntary organizations.' "81
The "consent" theory of tribal sovereignty has no basis in statute,
judicial precedent, or the Constitution. Its only real basis is in the
natural law arguments of the present majority. Justice Kennedy
asserts that "[c]riminal trial and punishment is so serious an intrusion
on personal liberty that its exercise over non-Indian citizens was a
power necessarily surrendered by the tribes in their submission to the
overriding sovereignty of the United States." 2 With this assertion a
large measure of tribal sovereignty ceased to exist.
C. The Duro Holding Is the Result of an Activist Expansion of the
Inherent Limitations Doctrine
Over the last decade the Supreme Court has assumed an activist role
in unilaterally decreasing the scope of retained tribal sovereignty.
Where federal law is unclear as to the extent of tribal authority, a less
active Court would begin with the established presumptions that tribal
79. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 343 (1981). In fact, the United States claims jurisdiction
over a number of crimes committed by aliens outside of its borders. See United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1068-69 nn. 1-4 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 343 (1981).
81. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
82. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2063.
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powers exist until divested,83 and that ambiguities in federal law are to
be resolved in favor of the tribes.84 It would then look to federal pol-
icy, which favors tribal self-determination.85 Recognizing that Con-
gress is the proper body to determine which powers, if any, should be
taken from the tribes, the Court would conclude that tribal powers
should be presumed retained unless Congress has divested them.
Instead, the Supreme Court has ignored federal policy and expanded
the judicially-created doctrine of inherent limitations to divest tribes of
broad powers, largely on the basis of dicta from its own recent
precedent.
Despite their dicta, none of the decisions prior to Duro mandated
the Duro holding. Neither Oliphant nor Wheeler dealt with the inher-
ent powers of tribes over nonmember Indians.86 However, dicta in the
Wheeler opinion implied that Oliphant had reached the issue:
The areas in which such [an] implicit divestiture of [tribal] sovereignty
has been held to have occurred are those involving the relations between
an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe .... [W]e have recently
held [that tribes] cannot try nonmembers in tribal courts. [citing
Oliphant].87
Justice Stewart's overbroad characterization of Oliphant was
repeated in a series of later decisions. One of the issues in Montana v.
United States" was whether a tribe's inherent sovereignty included
the power to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on fee lands
located within its reservation. The Court held that it did not, citing
the above-quoted language from Wheeler, and stating:
Though Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority in criminal
matters, the principles on which it relied support the general proposition
that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to
the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.89
This statement further distorts the Oliphant opinion. The principles
Oliphant relied upon were the historical understandings of the three
branches of government and the relationship between tribes and non-
Indian criminals. These "principles" did not support the excessively
83. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); see supra note 21 and accompanying
text.
84. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n,
411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973).
85. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
87. United States v. Wheeler, 435 US. 313, 326 (citations omitted).
88. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
89. Id. at 565.
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broad general proposition that tribal authority cannot extend over
nonmembers of the tribe.
This general proposition appeared again in the dissenting opinion in
Merrion v Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 90 and finally, in Justice White's plu-
rality/dissent in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima
Indian Nation. 91 In Brendale, Justice White contended in dissent that
all tribal regulation of fee land within a reservation was improper
unless necessary to protect the health, safety and welfare of the tribe.
Justice White asserted that Wheeler "made [it] clear" that "regulation
of 'the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe'
is necessarily inconsistent with a tribe's dependent status, and there-
fore tribal sovereignty over such matters of 'external relations' is
divested." 92 Justice White does not explain how a case dealing with
the double jeopardy implications of bringing separate tribal and fed-
eral prosecutions against a tribal Indian could make any such broad
proposition "clear" as a matter of law.
Neither Oliphant, Wheeler, nor any of the cases misconstruing their
holdings in dicta disposed of the issue of retained tribal powers over
nonmember tribal Indians. The misstatements in these cases are not
inadvertent, however, as the concrete holding of Duro makes clear.
They represent an activist approach to lawmaking: turning narrow
holdings into sweeping legal propositions which are then applied to a
broad range of controversies fundamentally different than that from
which the "rule" is derived.93 Thus, a decision holding that tribes
implicitly gave up the power to sell land, and a later decision holding
that tribes similarly lost criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, turn
with a stroke of the judicial pen into holdings that purport to extin-
guish tribal sovereignty over all nonmembers. This type of judicial
activism is particularly inappropriate in the realm of Indian law,
where law and tradition have made Congress the protector and over-
seer of the tribes.
90. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). Discussed supra at notes 72-75.
91. 109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989). Justice White wrote part of the plurality opinion and dissented to
another part.
92. Id. at 3006.
93. Of course, a willingness to label a particular line of decisions "activist" seems to depend to
a large extent upon whether one's toes are the ones being trampled. However, there is general
agreement that judicial restraint envisions deciding cases on the narrowest possible grounds. See,
eg., Riggs & Proffitt, The Judicial Philosophy of Justice Rehnquist, 16 AKRON L. REV. 555, 566
(1983).
Washington Law Review Vol. 66:567, 1991
D. The Duro Holding Creates Legal and Practical Problems for
Controlling Non-felony Crime on Reservations
The Duro holding creates both a de jure and a de facto jurisdictional
void over misdemeanor crimes committed by nonmember tribal Indi-
ans on reservations. This complex jurisdictional problem may force
tribes to accept unwanted state jurisdiction, contrary to federal policy.
Almost all of the tribes will be adversely affected in light of their sig-
nificant nonmember Indian populations.94
The Duro holding creates a de jure jurisdictional void under the fed-
eral criminal jurisdictional scheme. The Major Crimes Act only
applies to fourteen felonies, and section 1152 exempts other inter-
Indian crimes from federal coverage. States which have not obtained
jurisdiction under PL 280 also lack jurisdiction over such crimes. 95
Thus, as a result of Duro, on many reservations no authority has juris-
diction over non-felony inter-tribal crimes.9 6
The Duro Court glosses over the de jure jurisdictional problem by
stating it is a problem for Congress, and furthermore, that tribes can
submit to state jurisdiction under PL 280.9 7 However, extension of
94. Census data for 201 of the 278 listed tribes indicates that at least 24,450 enrolled Indians
live on reservations of tribes other than those in which they are enrolled. The average
nonmember population is 14%, with over half of all reported reservations containing
nonmember populations of 10% or more. United States Brief as Amicus Curiae at 19 n.27, Duro
v. Reina, 110 S.Ct 2053 (1990) (No. 88-6546) (citing 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION, Table 4, pt. 2, at 27 (1986)).
95. See Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2070 n. 3 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832)); see also supra note 63. Pub. L. No. 280,
67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26, 28 U.S.C. § 1360),
gave six states criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian country within their borders, and
allowed others to assume jurisdiction at will. Ten states accepted some degree of jurisdiction
under the Act. F. COHEN, supra note 21, at 362. Only Florida assumed the full degree of Pub.
L. 280 jurisdiction. Id. at 362 n.125. Since a 1968 amendment requiring tribal assent to further
assumptions of state jurisdiction, only one state has obtained jurisdiction under the Act. Id. at
362-63.
96. As a Senate committee recently stated:
In at least twenty states with substantial Indian populations, the [Duro] decision has created
a jurisdictional void in which neither a tribe, a state, or the Federal government is exercising
jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-tribal member Indians in Indian country.
... [U]nless the Congress acts to fill this jurisdictional void, those who identify themselves
as Indian and are recognized under Federal law (18 U.S.C. 1153) as Indian, may come onto
an Indian reservation, commit a criminal misdemeanor, and know that there is no
governmental entity that has the jurisdiction to prosecute them for their acts. Such is the
situation across Indian country since the Court's ruling in May.
Senate Report, supra note 1 at 132.
97. Id. at 2065-66. The Court also noted, without expressing an opinion on the matter, that
federal jurisdiction might be obtained by interpreting § 1152 to mean "tribal member" where it
says "Indian," id. at 2066, and that tribes retain the power to exclude undesirables from their
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state jurisdiction over Indian country is directly contrary to the federal
policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency,98 and has been universally
rejected by the tribes.99
Even if tribes wished to submit to state jurisdiction, most states have
neither the will nor the means to enforce minor criminal laws within
reservations, many of which are remotely located."°° The tribes are
the logical body to handle enforcement of these crimes, because they
have the most direct interest and closest enforcement resources.
E. A Better Answer: Tribal Sovereignty Over Nonmember Tribal
Indians Based on Implied Consent
The Duro court should have held that all Indians who are members
of a tribe are subject to the criminal jurisdiction of any reservation
upon which they commit a crime, under an implied consent theory.
This would balance the interests of the tribes against the interests of
individual Indians; for Indians who do not wish to fall under a partic-
ular tribe's jurisdiction could either refrain from entering its jurisdic-
tion or relinquish tribal membership, along with the benefits that
accompany such membership.
1. The Supreme Court Correctly Rejected the Ninth Circuit's
Significant Contacts Approach
The Court was correct to reject the Ninth Circuit's "significant con-
tacts" approach to defining tribal criminal jurisdiction. Under that
approach, nonmembers would be subject to tribal jurisdiction only
when their contacts with the tribe were sufficient to justify it.101 This
approach, similar to the "minimum contacts" doctrine used to deter-
mine state civil jurisdiction,1 "2 is inappropriate for criminal jurisdic-
tion. A person who has endangered the health, safety and welfare of
lands. Id. at 2065-66. There are problems with both of these suggestions. The problem with the
former is that § 1152 has not been so interpreted, and even if it were, federal authorities are
reluctant to expend scarce resources enforcing misdemeanor crimes on reservations. T. Maloney,
Comments at The Fourth Annual Western Regional Indian Law Symposium (Sept. 20-21, 1990)
(notes on file with the Washington Law Review). There are numerous problems with the latter
approach. For example, nonmembers who own fee land on reservations cannot be excluded. F.
COHEN, supra note 21, at 252. Furthermore, excluding nonmembers with family ties to members
of the tribe can hurt innocent parties. Maloney, supra. Finally, it is difficult to enforce exclusion
orders on reservations with open boarders. Id
98. See supra notes 28-29.
99. See F. COHEN, supra note 21, at 363.
100. See REPORT OF THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, INDIAN TRIBES: A CONTINUING
QUEST FOR SURVIVAL 145 (GPO 1981).
101. Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990).
102. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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reservation residents by committing a crime has undoubtedly estab-
lished sufficient contacts to alleviate due process concerns. It would
be impractical and unnecessary to require tribal courts to perform a
complex analysis of interests for every minor crime within their
jurisdiction.
2. The Court Erred in Failing to Adopt an Implied Consent
Approach
Applying an implied consent approach to inter-tribal crimes would
have avoided the jurisdictional void created by the Duro holding and
would have been consistent with established notions of tribal sover-
eignty. It would not have created the due process problems envisioned
by the district court.
a. An Implied Consent Approach Would Be Consistent With
Historical Notions of Tribal Sovereignty
Under traditional notions of sovereignty, Indian tribes have the
responsibility of preserving law and order within their reservations.
The power to carry out this responsibility has not been relinquished by
the tribes; nor has it been taken away by Congress, except where major
crimes and crimes involving non-Indians are concerned.10 3 On the
contrary, Congress has always apparently assumed that the tribes had
such power,"0 and has recently encouraged its development. 05 Tribal
sovereignty over nonmember tribal Indians has thus traditionally been
viewed as similar to state sovereignty over nonresidents.' 06 The tribal
authority envisioned by the Duro Court, in contrast, is not sovereignty
at all, but a new judicial creation divorced from traditional notions
and adaptable to the whims of the Court.
b. An Implied Consent Approach Would Not Violate Constitutional
Principles
The district court held that because tribes could not assert criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians after Oliphant, subjecting nonmember
tribal Indians to such jurisdiction would be a purely racial classifica-
tion, contrary to the equal protection requirements of ICRA. °7 The
Duro majority also stated that as a U.S. citizen, Duro was entitled to
103. See supra notes 13, 30-39 and accompanying text.
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
107. Duro v. Reina, 12 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 3003 (D. Ariz.
1985), rev'd, 821 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1987), revised, 851 F.2d 1136, rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990).
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the same constitutional protections as a non-Indian.108 The Duro
Court did not reach the equal protection issue, however, because its
holding on inherent limitations grounds disposed of the case.
A ruling that tribal courts have criminal jurisdiction over nonmem-
ber tribal Indians would not violate ICRA or the United States Con-
stitution. It would not violate ICRA because ICRA only requires
tribal courts to treat everyone within their jurisdiction equally.' °9
Under Oliphant, non-Indians do not fall within tribal jurisdiction.
Nor would it be a racial classification violating the United States
Constitution, for the simple reason that tribal membership is not a
racial classification. Tribal membership is a voluntary affiliation; race
is a necessary but not exclusive element.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that federal legislation treat-
ing tribal Indians differently as a class is not based upon an unconsti-
tutional racial classification. In United States v. Antelope, 110 the Court
stated:
The decisions of this court leave no doubt that federal legislation with
respect to Indian tribes, although relating to Indians as such, is not
based upon impermissible racial classifications. Quite the contrary, clas-
sifications expressly singling out Indian tribes as subjects of legislation
are expressly provided for in the Constitution and supported by the
ensuing history of the Federal Government's relations with the
Indians. 11
Similarly, in Fisher v. District Court "2 the Court held that a tribal
ordinance denying tribal members access to state court by giving the
tribe exclusive jurisdiction over the adoption of tribal children did not
constitute impermissible racial discrimination because "[t]he exclusive
jurisdiction does not derive from the race of the plaintiff but rather
from the quasi-sovereign status of the [tribe] under federal law." '
108. Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2063. ("Indians like other citizens are embraced within
our Nation's 'great solicitude that its citizens be protected... from unwarranted intrusions on
their personal liberty.' ") (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978)).
109. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1988).
110. 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
111. Id. at 645 (citations omitted). The case involved two tribal Indians who were convicted
under the federal felony-murder rule of first degree murder. Premeditation is not an element of
first degree murder under the felony-murder rule. If the defendants and their victim would have
been non-Indians, they would have been tried in state court, and under state law premeditation
was required for first degree murder. The Court of Appeals held that this disparity between
Indian and non-Indian prosecutions put the defendants "at a serious racially-based
disadvantage," in violation of the equal protection requirements implicit in the fifth amendment.
United States v. Antelope, 523 F.2d 400, 406 (9th Cir. 1975), rey'd, 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
112. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
113. Id. at 390.
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Under the analysis of these cases, diffentiating between tribal Indi-
ans and others for purposes of tribal criminal jurisdiction would not be
an impermissible racial classification.114 As long as tribes treat all tri-
bal Indians equally, there is no equal protection violation." 5
III. CONCLUSION
The Duro decision was a product of the present majority's activist
concerns over assertions of tribal powers. The decision runs contrary
to the fact that Congress is the proper body to weigh the policies for
and against divesting tribal powers, not the courts. Congress should
be careful in any attempt to reinstate the jurisdiction of tribal courts
over inter-tribal crimes, for the present Court will clearly view even
congressionally authorized assertions of criminal jurisdiction by the
tribes over nonmembers with suspicion. In light of the present major-
ity sentiment evidenced by Duro and other recent precedent, tribes
should make efforts to settle disputes rather than litigate issues of
retained tribal sovereignty before the Supreme Court.
Peter Fabish
114. Although Antelope dealt with congressional acts as opposed to tribal jurisdiction, tribal
jurisdiction is implicitly defined by the federal jurisdictional structure.
115. The Eighth Circuit expressed some concern in Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486,
488-89 (8th Cir. 1988), that inter-tribal animosities might cause nonmember tribal Indians to be
unfairly treated. However, ICRA provides federal habeas corpus relief for people treated
unfairly in tribal court. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1988). In addition to being irrelevant, the Eighth
Circuit's comments about the animosities between the tribes are disrespectful of the tribes' ability
to ignore such problems, if they exist, in the name of criminal justice, just as state courts are
required to do for non-resident defendants.
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